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Taxpayers and politicians expect public schools to exercise steward-
ship and wisdom regarding the use of resources entrusted to them. 
These public expectations approximate what economists refer to as 
technical efficiency.  Technical efficiency emerges from the ideal use of 
available resources for maximizing output whereas allocative efficiency 
derives from comparing alternative technically efficient systems and 
choosing the least costly option.1 A third and more obscure type of 
efficiency emerges in economic analysis from an interpretation of the 
unobserved effects of the entity studied. This phenomenon is some-
times referred to as "x-efficiency." Its significance comes from the 
unobserved effects of vision, motivation, incentives, and the culture 
of the entity and its leadership.2
Evidence exists that qualitative factors such as clearly defined goals, 
uninhibited access to information regarding these goals, incentives, 
motivation and effort, often the fruit of competition or adversity, yield 
far greater output improvement compared to marginal changes in 
inputs.3 Quantity times price may generate a variety of results depend-
ing on these unobserved factors. Improving student achievement by 
accomplishing changes in school organizational behavior represents 
direct application of x-efficiency.
The analysis in this study draws heavily on the notions of both 
technical  efficiency and x-efficiency. Both of these lend themselves to 
an input/output style of inquiry like the education production function. 
This economic model builds on the foundation of the Cobb-Douglas 
factors of production theory although the genesis of that theory relates 
to industrial not educational formulations.4 
Research Design
The goal of this study was to estimate the effects of district ef-
ficiency on student achievement in Michigan with the hope that ob-
jective analysis might serve to ease progress through the troublesome 
political process any transition to an adequacy-based school finance 
model will encounter. This study draws upon the methodology used 
by Phelps and Addonizio in their 2006 study of school accountability 
in Minnesota.5
Michigan does not track student achievement data by individual 
teacher or per pupil expenditures by school, only by district. Were per 
pupil expenditure available by school, the flow to individual students 
would require reliance on assumptions and averages. The unavailability 
of test score data by classroom or teacher, combined with the lack 
of reliable per pupil expenditure data by school and the abstraction 
caused by artificial resource flow assumptions, prompted the study’s 
use of the district as the unit of analysis. District level data for MEAP 
(Michigan Educational Assessment Program) scores and per pupil 
expenditure came from the State of Michigan website.
The operative version of the theoretical education production func-
tion for use in this study appears below:6
Mt = b0 + b1pctenroll + b2avg_t_sal + b3avg_p_tchr + b4avg_isal
 + b5avg_totexp_ntr + u + e
Where
M represents statewide Michigan Education Assessment Program 
(MEAP) reading and math scores, stated as the percentage of  
students taking the test who achieved at a level meeting state 
standards; 
pctenroll equals the percentage of students in a district eligible to 
receive free or reduced-pric meals under U.S. federal guidelines; 
avg_t_sal denotes the average teacher salary in the district; 
avg_p_tchr is the average number of pupils per district teacher; 
avg_isal is the average per pupil district expenditures related to 
instructional salaries;
avg_totexp_ntr controls for total district expenditures per pupil, 
net of transportation;
"u" signifies the portion of the residual that does not vary over 
time but does vary by district (This can be referred to as the 
district fixed effect and is estimated following regression); 
"e" signifies the random portion of unobserved, residual, or 
unexplained variation. 
Analysis of the residuals in the fashion indicated above requires 
retrieval of multiple observations for each district over time. This study 
includes a balanced panel of observations for districts over four years 
starting with the 2001-2002 school year through 2004-2005. The aver-
age residual by district was used to proxy for the district fixed effect 
in second stage regressions.
Although the model specified above contains no variable for district 
size, the regression technique used for this study was weighted by 
the full time equivalent student population for each district in each 
year. This adjusts for district size and mitigates the lack of constant 
variance in the residuals (heteroscedasticity) which represents one of 
the basic assumptions underlying linear regression.
Analysis of Data And Results
Data Description
Data were collected from public files available on the websites of the 
Michigan Department of Education (MDE) and Center for Educational 
Performance and Information (CEPI). Data for the dependent variable 
came from MEAP scores maintained by the Office of Educational 
Assessment and Accountability (OEAA) of the MDE. The second 
file type contained district financial information called Bulletin 1014 
administered by the MDE Office of State Aid and School Finance. Data 
for student eligibility for federal meal subsidies came from information 
contained in the Single Record Student Data base controlled by CEPI. A 
file representing various measures of a single element in this database 
called Free and Reduced Lunch (FRL) appears on the CEPI website.
Bulletin 1014 files contained the most accurate district count as 
verified with the School Code Master file maintained by MDE. The 
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number of districts reporting in Bulletin 1014 for the years included in 
the panel from 2001-2002  through 2004-2005 school years as follows: 
743, 742, 744, and 760. However, only 494 districts reported data for 
every field used in the model for every year in the panel. The primary 
source for this discrepancy comes from counting each charter school as 
a separate district.7  However, several traditional districts were excluded 
from the study panel. Some traditional school districts in Michigan 
do not offer all twelve grades. For the study, any district that did not 
offer either seventh or eighth grade was necessarily eliminated from 
the panel. Also, MEAP scores are not reported in the public files for 
districts with fewer than ten test-takers in a grade. 
Descriptive statistics for the 494 district panel are presented in 
Table 1. The summary of the dataset contained in Table 1 represents 
the same 494 Michigan school districts observed across four years 
for a total of 1,976 observations. The means and standard deviations 
reported for each explanatory variable were determined after weighting 
each variable by the inverse of variance for the student population. 
This technique is useful for observations containing averages. Aver-
ages based on the number of observations grow in precision as the 
number increases. Weighting provides the means to concede greater 
importance to the more precise measurements.8 Weighting consid-
ers the variation in the data by student although the unit of analysis 
remains aggregated by district.
Preliminary Annual Test Results
A preliminary set of sixteen regressions for all four measures of 
student achievement and separately for each of the four years served 
several purposes. Review of model specification, fit, and model diagno-
sis represented the primary motivation. The regressions were weighted 
by the student population of each school district as discussed above. 
This procedure corrected for the anticipated lack of constant vari-
ance in the model error term caused by the wide variance in district 
size as measured by the number of students. This heteroscedasticity 
represented the principal diagnostic problem related to the underlying 
assumptions for least squares regression. The weighting methodol-
ogy provided significant improvement but did not entirely correct the 
problem for all years in the study.9 
Analysis of Residuals
Some variation in the student achievement measures from the 
regressions referred to above remained unexplained. These residuals 
contained the fixed but unobserved effect of the district plus random 
error.10 The average residual for each district was used to investigate 
systematic achievement above or below that predicted by the explana-
tory variables in each year. The result was assumed to measure the 
extent to which the district benefited from "x-efficiency," or contribu-
tion to student achievement not captured by the variables specified 
in the model. This estimate of district fixed effect was used as an 
explanatory variable in second stage regressions. 
This simple averaging method for estimating district fixed effects was 
used after several attempts at fixed effects regression models failed to 
untangle the high correlation between the explanatory variables and 
fixed portion of the residual.11 This correlation also proscribed the use 
of random effects or generalized least squares methodology. 
Post Estimation Annual Test Results Including Fixed Effects Estimates
The sixteen regression results in Tables 2-5 came from estimating 
the same model described, but not presented, for preliminary annual 
tests, with one exception. The models estimated here included the 
variable determined in the previous section to represent the fixed effect 
of each district (avg_resid). This variable represented a relative measure 
of each district’s contribution to the percentage of students meeting 
or exceeding state standards after controlling for the other predictors. 
The residual was averaged for each district using the results of the 
preliminary regressions for MEAP math and reading tests in fourth, 
seventh, and eighth grades. The results were analytically weighted by 
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics, 2002–2005
Variables Observations Weight Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
district 1,976 6,438,484 1.010 83,070
year 1,976 6,438,484 2002 2005
math_gr4_sat 1,976 6,438,484 0.695465 0.143724 0.101 1
read_gr4_sat 1,976 6,438,484 0.741757 0.155611 0.13 1
read_gr7_sat 1,976 6,438,484 0.614158 0.174635 0.124 0.97
math_gr8_sat 1,976 6,438,484 0.572979 0.188827 0.057 1
pctenroll 1,976 6,438,484 0.333412 0.217264 0.02 0.9
avg_t_sal 1,976 6,438,484 54056.33 6903.321 24,547 83,479
avg_p_tchr 1,976 6,438,484 21.73831 2.565409 9 33
avg_isal 1,976 6,438,484 4663.104 585.9229 2,827 7,010
avg_totexp_ntr 1,976 6,438,484 8002.849 1294.894 5,416 15,628
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Table 2
Grade 4 Math Scores Post-Estimation WLS Regression Results
School Year
Variables 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005
pctenroll -0.465*** -.0473*** -.0495*** -.0502***
[-0.61] [-0.63] [-0.70] [-0.75]
(0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017)
avg_t_sal -0.000000217 0.000000662 -0.000000596 0.000000939
[-0.010] [0.033] [0-0.032] [0.053]
(0.00000063) (0.00000059) (0.00000060) (0.00000058)
avg_p_tchr -0.00331** -0.00490*** -0.00720*** -0.00982***
[-0.054] [-0.088] [-0.16] [-0.22]
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0015)
avg_isal 0.0000564*** 0.0000366*** 0.0000473*** 0.0000425***
[0.20] [0.13] [0.19] [0.19]
(0.000011) (0.0000095) (0.0000095) (0.000010)
avg_totexp_ntr -0.0000216*** -0.0000177*** 0.0000232*** -0.0000277***
[-0.15] [-0.13] [-0.20] [-0.26]
(0.0000044) (0.0000040) (0.0000036) (0.0000039)
avg_resid 1.036*** 1.086*** 1.125*** 1.303***
[0.60] [0.63] [0.69] [0.83]
(0.034) (0.034) (0.037) (0.042)
Constant 0.907*** 0.891*** 1.010*** 0.983***
[6.92] [6.81] [8.22] [8.30]
(0.034) (0.029) (0.031) (0.036)
Observations (n) 494 494 494 494
R-squared 0.90 0.90 0.89 0.87
Note: Normalized beta coefficients in brackets. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
the inverse of variance for each district's student population.  Each of 
the four tables of regression results presented represents one of the 
four measures of student achievement regressed over the independent 
variables for all four years included in the study.
The fixed effect variable (avg_resid) was statistically significant 
with a positive coefficient for all sixteen regressions. The measure for 
socioeconomic status (pctenroll) also remained statistically significant 
with a negative coefficient across all sixteen model iterations. A one 
percent increase in students eligible for free or reduced meals was 
associated with anywhere from one-third to three quarters of a percent 
decrease in the percentage of students achieving state standards on 
the MEAP depending on the year and subject matter.
All the district resource variables except teacher salaries (avg_t_sal) 
were statistically significant for all of the regression models. The vari-
able for teacher salaries remained statistically insignificant for all except 
two regressions. The pupil-teacher ratio (avg_p_tchr) was negative 
and statistically significant across all sixteen regressions. Its beta 
coefficient, with only one exception, represented the smallest impact 
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Table 3
Grade 4 Reading Scores Post-Estimation WLS Regression Results
School Year
Variables 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005
pctenroll -0.486*** -0.372*** -0.389*** -0.378***
[-0.68] [-0.63] [-0.70] [-0.75]
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012)
avg_t_sal -0.000000261 0.000000919* -0.000000655 0.000000638
[-0.013] [-0.058] [-0.045] [-0.049]
(0.00000051) (0.00000054) (0.00000052) (0.00000041)
avg_p_tchr -0.00593** -0.00474*** -0.00527*** -0.00395***
[-0.10] [-0.11] [-0.15] [-0.12]
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0010)
avg_isal 0.0000475*** 0.0000696*** 0.0000419*** 0.0000421***
[0.18] [0.33] [0.22] [0.25]
(0.0000086) (0.0000087) (0.0000082) (0.0000071)
avg_totexp_ntr -0.0000302*** -0.0000376*** 0.0000282*** -0.0000239***
[-0.22] [-0.35] [-0.31] [-0.30]
(0.0000035) (0.0000037) (0.0000031) (0.0000028)
avg_resid 0.978*** 0.905*** 0.799*** 0.727***
[0.60] [0.67] [0.63] [0.62]
(0.028) (0.032) (0.032) (0.030)
Constant 0.991*** 1.030*** 1.084*** 1.018***
[8.00] [10.0] [11.3] [11.5]
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025)
Observations (n) 494 494 494 494
R-squared 0.94 0.89 0.87 0.87
Note: Normalized beta coefficients in brackets. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
of the school resources measured. The results for the share of the 
budget spent on instructional salaries per student (avg_isal) remained 
positive and statistically significant for all sixteen models estimated. 
with a relatively larger beta than the pupil-teacher ratio.
Total expenditures prior to transportation expense (avg_totexp_ntr) 
explained as much variation in student achievement as the other school 
variables with beta coefficients ranging from .15 to .35 standard devia-
tions of the dependent variable. The negative sign on this estimate 
might be explained by the higher expenditures necessary in urban 
school districts and the high correlation with instructional salaries.
A primary focus for this study was to analyze the extent to which 
school district efficiency explained the observed variation in student 
achievement. The difference in the explanatory power of the specified 
model after developing a proxy for district efficiency was analyzed by 
examining the differences in the R2 results for the regressions without 
a measure for district fixed effects and the regressions that include 
these measures.12
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School Year
Variables 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005
(1) (2) (3) (4)
pctenroll -0.533*** -0.605*** -0.594*** -0.568***
[-0.73] [-0.79] [-0.82] [-0.91]
(0.016) (0.015) (0.020) (0.015)
avg_t_sal -0.000000741 -0.000000445 -0.000000516 -0.000000446
[-0.036] [-0.022] [-0.027] [-0.027]
(0.00000063) (0.00000059) (0.00000067) (0.00000052)
avg_p_tchr -0.00795*** -0.0104*** -0.00482*** -0.00774***
[-0.13] [-0.19] [-0.10] [-0.19]
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0013)
avg_isal 0.0000486*** 0.0000582*** 0.0000713*** 0.0000512***
[0.18] [0.21] [0.28] [0.24]
(0.000011) (0.0000095) (0.000011) (0.0000090)
avg_totexp_ntr -0.0000356*** -0.0000391*** -0.0000312*** -0.0000313***
[-0.25] [-0.28] [-0.26] [-0.32]
(0.0000044) (0.0000040) (0.0000040) (0.0000035)
avg_resid 0.946*** 0.889*** 0.984*** 0.887***
[0.57] [0.51] [0.59] [0.61]
(0.034) (0.035) (0.041) (0.038)
Constant 1.037*** 1.115*** 0.820*** 1.063***
[8.22] [8.41] [6.50] [9.70]
(0.034) (0.029) (0.035) (0.032)
Observations (n) 494 494 494 494
R-squared 0.92 0.93 0.89 0.91
Note: Normalized beta coefficients in brackets. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4
Grade 7 Reading Scores Post-Estimation WLS Regression Results
Table 6 shows that after the inclusion of a proxy for district effect 
the explanatory power of the estimated model increases by fifteen 
percentage points. The difference in explanatory power remained con-
sistent across all four years in this study. This finding is an important 
consideration for any measure of school performance or accountability 
policy. In the absence of a direct measure for district effect, school 
accountability guidelines may actually only measure student charac-
teristics and the distribution of property wealth given the power of 
these variables to explain student achievement.13 The knowledge of 
what portion of the variation of student achievement is associated 
with unobserved district effects combined with the estimates that 
indicate both the direction and magnitude (Tables 2-5) of that effect, 
offers a good theoretical foundation upon which to build a school 
district accountability policy.
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School Year
Variables 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005
(1) (2) (3) (4)
pctenroll -0.634*** -0.668*** -0.641*** -0.672***
[-0.75] [-0.76] [-0.78] [-0.87]
(0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.017)
avg_t_sal -0.000000121 -0.000000638 -0.000000426 -0.000000119*
[-0.0052] [-0.027] [-0.020] [-0.059]
(0.00000068) (0.00000075) (0.00000073) (0.00000061)
avg_p_tchr -0.0123*** -0.00937*** -0.0121*** -0.00793***
[-0.18] [-0.14] [-0.23] [-0.16]
(0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0015)
avg_isal 0.0000647*** 0.0000528*** 0.0000569*** 0.0000814***
[0.21] [0.17] [0.20] [0.31]
(0.000012) (0.000012) (0.000012) (0.000011)
avg_totexp_ntr -0.0000392*** -0.0000323*** -0.0000441*** -0.0000438***
[-0.24] [-0.20] [-0.33] [-0.36]
(0.0000047) (0.0000051) (0.0000044) (0.0000041)
avg_resid 1.039*** 1.119*** 1.092*** 1.082***
[0.54] [0.55] [0.58] [0.60]
(0.037) (0.044) (0.045) (0.044)
Constant 1.112*** 1.010*** 1.132*** 0.982***
[7.67] [6.60] [7.96] [7.23]
(0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037)
Observations (n) 494 494 494 494
R-squared 0.93 0.91 0.91 0.91
Table 5
Grade 8 Math Scores Post-Estimation WLS Regression Results
Note: Normalized beta coefficients in brackets. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In addition, this procedure supplies an objective measure for use in 
assuring the public and political decisionmakers that funding school 
districts based on adequacy does not simply reward inefficiency. The 
objective measurement of district effects provides the means for adjust-
ing legitimate, educationally based, funding differences among districts 
for the excess costs they encounter due to their own inefficiency.
It is also apparent from Table 6 that district efficiency explains a 
larger share of the variance in student achievement for the fourth 
grade than for either the seventh or eighth grades. The fourth grade 
change is larger for math than for reading. The differences between 
math and reading narrow in the higher grades. Unobserved effects, for 
example, school culture, communication, goal orientation, and focus 
might be more highly associated with early student achievement more 
than in later grades. 
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Table 6.1 R-squared for Preliminary Tests on Reading and Math
School Year
Average
2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005
read_gr4_sat 0.78 0.70 0.71 0.72 0.73
read_gr7_sat 0.80 0.84 0.75 0.80 0.80
math_gr8_sat 0.82 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.80
Table 6.2 R-squared for Post Estimation Tests on Reading and Math
School Year
Average
2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005
math_gr4_sat 0.90 0.90 0.89 0.87 0.89
read_gr4_sat 0.94 0.89 0.87 0.87 0.89
read_gr7_sat 0.92 0.93 0.89 0.91 0.91
math_gr8_sat 0.93 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.92
Table 6.3 R-squared Differences
School Year
Average
2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005
math_gr4_sat 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.26 0.22
read_gr4_sat 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.15 0.17
read_gr7_sat 0.12 0.09 0.14 0.11 0.12
math_gr8_sat 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.12
Average R-squared 
difference 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15
Table 6
Increased Explanatory Power from District Fixed Effects: R-squared Differences
One implication of the disparity of the association of district 
effect with student achievement depending on grade level comes from 
separately measuring school accountability or adjusting differential 
funding by grade. This type of adjustment would be more achievable 
if the data were available to replicate this study for individual school 
buildings instead of entire districts. 
 
Conclusions, Implications for Policy, and Further Study
The primary purpose of this study was to test a method for measur-
ing Michigan school district efficiency that could be used to modify a 
future statewide school funding model based on adequacy. The latter 
would replace. the current resource equity finance system. Besides 
production efficiency, the desired indicator also gauges "x-efficiency." 
This concept evaluates organizational and qualitative attributes of 
districts not readily observed quantitatively. 
The foremost consequence of understanding and measuring the 
effect of Michigan school district efficiency on student achievement 
comes from its use to modify Michigan school funding. Redistribution 
of scarce resources always faces political difficulty and public resistance 
from those who would bear the burden of providing the benefit to oth-
ers. Admittedly, this renders a change to an adequacy based Michigan 
school finance formula politically improbable. However, some future 
political circumstance, similar to the historical pressure for property 
tax reform, could materialize and grant unanticipated prominence 
to this presently dormant policy perspective. Some states have only 
addressed adequacy of school finance due to actual or threatened 
7
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litigation, usually arising out of fresh interpretations of their constitu-
tional educational clause. One genuine objection to adequacy comes 
from the trepidation for rewarding districts experiencing higher costs 
precipitated at least partially by factors within their control. The 
reported results from this research lay the groundwork for minimizing 
this risk. Identifying the variation in student achievement explained by 
district effects could help limit funding differences to only the higher 
costs unrelated to district efficiency.
A second policy implication arising from this research comes from 
its demonstration of the need for better data. Sacrifices were made 
regarding the unit of analysis and teacher characteristics precipitated 
by insufficient data. While this comment hardly seems unexpected 
from a quantitative researcher, it also represents a common problem 
for educators across the country, including in Michigan. The need for 
the retention, ready access, and analysis of student data remains acute 
in most states. Most states do provide paper reports, lagged by several 
months, to teachers and administrators regarding student test results. 
Only five states provide advanced information systems for students 
and teachers plus offer the means to link the two systems.14
Michigan should not allow charter schools to avoid reporting crucial 
data through their use of management companies. An argument based 
on form that a charter school has no salaries to report cannot be sus-
tained in substance. In essence, the management company pays the 
salaries as agent for the charter school board of control. Although part 
of the logic behind charters comes from freedom from bureaucracy, 
this should not be allowed to interfere with the obligation to demand 
performance for the investment of tax dollars. This quirk needs to be 
addressed administratively or by legislation. Neither should Michigan 
allow bargaining groups or any other special interest to politically pre-
vent the matching of student and teacher performance information.
Previous research has demonstrated that class size reduction has 
positive effects for student achievement.15 Some studies reveal dimin-
ishing effects for smaller classes.16 Sometimes they report the positive 
impact of teacher quality, in addition to the class size measure of 
teacher quantity.17 Evidence supporting more cost-effective means of 
producing positive effects on student achievement may explain the 
current results controlling for district efficiency.18 Perhaps improvements 
in teacher quality can be achieved with aggressive financial incentives 
to recruit the most qualified and talented people. Organizing learning 
with higher paid instructional managers supervising larger groups of 
students assisted by less expensive support staff and technology may 
leverage teacher resources. 
In 2005-2006, Michigan began testing students in contiguous years, 
as required by the NCLB Act, during grades three through eight for 
math and English language arts. This will provide the opportunity to 
measure school performance and efficiency using the student achieve-
ment gains accomplished in a single year. It also facilitates the use of 
lagged student achievement measures as an explanatory variable. This 
helps account for innate ability and student learning prior to the point 
of collection for the lagged data. A third enrichment grows out of the 
ability to measure a single school. This of course assumes that the data 
elements necessary for school level analysis become available. Student 
level analysis with linkage to specific classrooms and teachers would 
provide both increased methodological validity and overall credibility. 
Direct measures of class size and teacher characteristics also represent 
improvements. Replication would also be possible using a sample of 
districts, or even schools, where data was collected directly from the 
agency and not from the state.
In addition to the need for further quantitative research, only quali-
tative study will provide the interpretation of what specific attributes 
differentiate the districts with positive fixed effects from those that 
prove negative. Well documented, thorough, and repetitive observa-
tions and interviews at sites with the highest and lowest magnitude 
of fixed effect residuals may be necessary. 
Guidance for school districts where funding was adjusted downward 
as a reflection of inefficiency provides a key ingredient to a school 
funding system based on adequacy. Meaningful direction will depend 
on the results of the future research, referred to above, that isolates the 
elements producing both "x-efficiency" and resource efficiency. Clarity 
regarding these components provides an essential element in creating 
a financial incentive for improvement. Only cost differences outside 
of district control should lead to increased funding. Inefficiencies of 
the district, that increase cost, should not be rewarded.
This study established the relationship between district effects and 
student achievement. One policy implication includes the adjustment 
of district funding by some factor representing the district effect on 
student achievement, in order to avoid rewarding inefficiency. The 
actual derivation of an adjustment factor for application to Michigan 
per pupil school funding represents the seeds for future study. This 
work should address the limitations previously discussed, especially 
regarding data quality and more complete measures for student achieve-
ment. It should also provide detailed guidance regarding the range of 
choices and qualitative elements of district efficiency.
Regardless of the actual formula chosen, the care, transparency, and 
thoroughness of the process for its creation and implementation will 
help determine utility for transitioning to an adequacy-based school 
finance system in Michigan. The evidence presented here regarding the 
relationship between district effects and student achievement provides 
an introductory, but significant, contribution to this Michigan school 
finance policy arena.
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